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CAUDLE v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: THE 
GOLDEN RULE HAS NO PLACE IN A 
COURTROOM 
Abstract: On February 15, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in Caudle v. District of Columbia held that golden rule arguments 
made in the context of liability are prejudicial and can warrant the granting of 
a new trial. This Comment argues that the damages-liability distinction for 
golden rule arguments as applied by the Second, Fifth, Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits is the appropriate approach, and that there should not be a per se ex-
clusion of golden rule arguments on the issue of liability. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal courts have long drawn distinctions between types of argu-
ments that are allowable and those that are prejudicial in the context of 
opening and closing arguments, even occasionally finding an argument to 
be so prejudicial that it warrants a new trial.1 Among these, one of the most 
problematic has been the “golden rule” argument, which implores the jury 
to imagine themselves in the place of one of the parties.2 Every federal ap-
peals court that has considered the issue has agreed that a golden rule argu-
ment posed in the context of determining damages is prejudicial and may 
warrant a new trial.3 Nevertheless, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sec-
ond, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that golden rule argu-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Caudle v. District of Columbia, 707 F.3d 354, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Leathers v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 546 F.2d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1976); Callaghan v. A. Lague Express, 298 F.2d 
349, 351 (2d Cir. 1962); Klotz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 F.2d 53, 54–55 (7th Cir. 1959); F.W. 
Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1934). To emphasize its overall point of fair 
play, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Caudle v. District of Columbia 
ended its opinion with a footnote illustrating an often-quoted exchange between Judge Learned 
Hand and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 707 F.3d. at 363 n.10; see Michael Herz, “Do Jus-
tice!”: Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1996) (describing the example as 
“widely-used”). After having lunch together, Judge Hand wished an elderly Justice Holmes: 
“Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!” Whereupon Justice Holmes turned and remarked: “That is not 
my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules.” 707 F.3d at 363 n.10 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (citing Herz, supra, at 111). 
 2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 761 (9th ed. 2009). In other words, this argument is “essentially 
a suggestion to a jury by an attorney that the jurors should do unto others, normally the attorney’s 
client, as they would have others do unto them.” Kevin W. Brown, Annotation, Propriety and 
Prejudicial Effect of Attorney’s “Golden Rule” Argument to Jury in Federal Civil Case, 68 A.L.R. 
FED. 333, 334 (1984). 
 3 See, e.g., Leathers, 546 F.2d at 1086; Callaghan, 298 F.2d at 351; Klotz, 267 F.2d at 54–55; 
F.W. Woolworth, 74 F.2d at 442. 
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ments on the issue of liability are not prejudicial.4 According to these 
courts, there are fewer dangers associated with using the golden rule argu-
ment in the context of determining liability, as the rationale of avoiding a 
decision based on sympathy or emotion does not apply as strongly as when 
determining damages.5 
In contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
and the Third Circuit departed from their sister circuits, holding that any use 
of a golden rule argument is improper.6 These courts reasoned that a golden 
rule argument in either circumstance carried the same risk of causing the 
jury to make a decision based on undue sympathy or emotion.7 Therefore, 
in these circuits, the use of golden rule arguments is prejudicial in the con-
text of liability and may constitute grounds for a new trial.8 
Part I of this Comment describes the facts underlying the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia’s 2013 case Caudle v. District of Co-
lumbia.9 It also recounts the case’s procedural history prior to its arrival 
before the D.C. Circuit.10 Part II then examines the reasoning behind the 
Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits’ creation of the damages-
liability distinction for golden rule arguments.11 It then discusses the Third 
and D.C. Circuits’ subsequent rejection of that distinction.12 Finally, Part III 
argues that that the Caudle court incorrectly adopted the Third Circuit’s 
flawed reasoning in failing to adopt the liability-damages distinction and 
thereby eliminated a useful tool when articulating the reasonable person 
standard.13 Instead, in the context of determining liability, the trial judge 
should have discretion regarding whether the use of golden rule arguments 
is appropriate.14 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1071 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. 
Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1289 (2d Cir. 1990); Shultz v. Rice, 809 F.2d 643, 651–52 (10th 
Cir. 1986); Burrage v. Harrell, 537 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 5 McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 n.3; Johnson, 899 F.2d at 1289; Shultz, 809 F.2d at 651–52; Bur-
rage, 537 F.2d at 839. 
 6 Caudle, 707 F.3d at 357; Edwards v. City of Philadelphia, 860 F.2d 568, 574 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 7 See Caudle, 707 F.3d at 360; Edwards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6. 
 8 See Caudle, 707 F.3d at 357; Edwards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6. 
 9 See infra notes 15–23 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 24–36 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 37–56 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 57–69 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 70–89 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT IN CAUDLE v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINDS GOLDEN 
RULE ARGUMENTS DO NOT WARRANT A NEW TRIAL 
Beginning in late 2005, five African-American officers of the District 
of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department’s (“MPD”) First District Fo-
cus Mission Unit (“FMU”) believed that the new supervising lieutenant was 
discriminating against them on the basis of race.15 On June 16, 2006, the 
officers sent an anonymous letter to their commander expressing their con-
cerns about the new lieutenant.16 Shortly thereafter, the commander initiated 
a meeting among the FMU officers.17 She explained that she had received 
the complaint and shared portions of its contents.18 At the end of the meet-
ing, the commander queried whether the FMU officers could still work to-
gether.19 
Subsequent to this incident, the commander required all FMU officers 
to reapply to the unit.20 In addition, the African-American officers—who 
usually patrolled together—were forced to ride with other officers and were 
barred from a number of FMU operations.21 In the end, none of the reappli-
cations by the complaining African-American officers were approved.22 
Instead, these officers each ended up back in the patrol unit, which they 
considered to be a demotion from the FMU.23 
In February 2008, the demoted officers filed suit for retaliation against 
the District of Columbia (the “District”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Caudle v. District of Columbia, 804 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37–38 (D.D.C. 2010). The “FMU” is a 
specialized plainclothes unit composed of patrol officers. Id. at 38. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. The plaintiffs reported that the other attending officers “t[ook] shots at” them during the 
meeting and “appeared to know who was behind the unsigned complaint.” Id. (alteration in origi-
nal) (internal quotation marks omitted). After the meeting, members of the FMU unit reportedly 
“had trouble getting along.” Caudle, 707 F.3d at 357. It was around this time that officer Nikeith 
Goins—who was not party to the letter— “complained to [the lieutenant]” directly “about unfair 
treatment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20 Caudle, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 38. This was an “unprecedented step that [the commander]” 
testified was “motivated by performance concerns.” Id. 
 21 Id. Convinced their reassignments were retaliatory, the officers wrote a second complaint to 
the D.C. Office of Human Rights and to the U.S. Department of Justice. Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 39. Officer Frazier Caudle was the first to be relegated to the patrol unit. Id. Officers 
William James, Donald Smalls, and Goins were placed in a new “Intel unit,” which was com-
prised of only them, and was soon disbanded. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Afterwards, 
they too were assigned back to the patrol unit. Id. Officer Sholanda Miller was given an evening 
patrol shift. Id. 
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Act of 1964.24 At trial, a jury awarded the officers nearly one million dollars 
in damages.25 
Nevertheless, the District moved for a new trial on grounds that the 
plaintiffs’ attorney used three golden rule arguments.26 Again, “golden rule” 
arguments ask jurors to imagine either themselves or someone they care 
about in the place of one of the parties.27 The officers’ attorney made the 
following three golden rule statements during closing arguments—each of 
which were cut short by objection: 
(1) “[A]sk yourself, would you hesitate to speak up if you knew 
that speaking up would mean that your boss would call a meeting 
with your entire office . . . .”; 
(2) “Ask yourself this: Wouldn’t you think twice about complain-
ing about workplace discrimination . . . .”; and 
(3) “[I]t is your job to determine how to make [the] plaintiffs 
whole . . . . As you make those decisions, we ask yourselves [sic] 
to put yourselves in the plaintiffs’ shoes. What would it do to you 
to have your complaint broadcast to your entire office, to be the 
only one excluded . . . .”28 
Additionally, the District argued that the district court did not appro-
priately address these arguments, and therefore, the arguments constituted 
grounds for a new trial.29 The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a 
new trial on the grounds that the court adequately responded to each infrac-
tion during the trial and as a result, no prejudice occurred.30 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, hold-
ing that the golden rule arguments were improper.31 In reaching this conclu-
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (proscribing certain unlawful employment 
practices for employers). The standard for retaliation set by the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court case 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White forbids “employer actions that would have 
been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.” 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
 25 Caudle, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 39. The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs and awarded a 
total of $900,000 in compensatory damages. Id. 
 26 Id. at 52. 
 27 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 761; Brown, supra note 2, at 334. 
 28 Caudle, 707 F.3d at 358 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Caudle, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 52 nn.18–19 (observing that the arguments were interrupted). The trial 
court declined to decide if the plaintiffs’ counsel’s arguments were improper golden rule argu-
ments because it found that no prejudice occurred from them. Id. 
 29 Caudle, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 52–53. 
 30 Id. The court sustained the District’s objections to each golden rule argument before the 
plaintiffs’ attorney finished speaking. Id. at 52. In addition, after the final offense, the court told 
the jury to disregard the statements. Id. at 53. Finally, during jury instruction, the judge told the 
jury “to decide the facts of the case only from a fair evaluation of all the evidence without preju-
dice, sympathy, fear, favor, or public opinion.” Id. 
 31 Caudle, 707 F.3d at 357. 
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sion, the court considered each golden rule argument individually.32 The 
third argument—directed towards damages—was found readily prejudicial, 
as it was the type of golden rule argument that has been universally con-
demned.33 The first two arguments, however, were less clear because they 
were directed towards liability; nevertheless, the court still concluded that 
they were impermissible.34 Although the plaintiffs argued that these state-
ments merely explained the applicable reasonableness legal standard, the 
court concluded that the statements could have influenced the jury to de-
termine liability based on “undue sympathy or emotion.”35 The court then 
remanded the case to be determined in light of its opinion.36 
II. DIVERGENT OPINIONS ON THE USE OF GOLDEN RULE ARGUMENTS 
TOWARDS LIABILITY 
Although there is universal agreement among federal courts that gold-
en rule arguments are improper in the context of damages, there are diver-
gent opinions regarding the use of golden rule arguments towards ultimate 
liability.37 Specifically, when determining the amount of damages to award, 
all federal appeals courts have held that it is improper to ask the jury to put 
themselves in the place of the plaintiff.38 Courts agree that a golden rule 
argument creates a substantial risk that the jury will award disproportionate 
damages based on unfairly aroused sympathy or other improper emotion.39 
At least four federal appeals courts, however, have held that golden rule 
arguments are permissible with respect to the issue of ultimate liability.40 
Conversely, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejects this lia-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. at 358. 
 33 Id. at 360; see also, e.g., Leathers, 546 F.2d at 1086 (indicating that golden rule arguments 
in the context of damages have been universally condemned); Callaghan, 98 F.2d at 351 (same); 
Klotz, 267 F.2d at 54–55 (same); F.W. Woolworth, 74 F.2d at 4 (same). 
 34 Caudle, 707 F.3d at 360. 
 35 See id. at 360–61 (quoting Edwards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6). 
 36 Id. at 363. 
 37 See, e.g., Leathers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 546 F.2d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1976) (observing 
the universal rejection of golden rule arguments in the context of damages); Callaghan v. A. Lague 
Express, 298 F.2d 349, 351 (2d Cir. 1962) (same); Klotz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 F.2d 53, 
54–55 (7th Cir. 1959) (same). Compare Edwards v. City of Philadelphia, 860 F.2d 568, 574 n.6 
(3d Cir. 1988) (rejecting golden rule arguments in the context of liability), with Burrage v. Harrell, 
537 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1976) (allowing golden rule arguments in the context of liability). 
 38 See, e.g., Leathers, 546 F.2d at 1086; Callaghan, 298 F.2d at 351; Klotz, 267 F.2d at 54–55; 
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1934). 
 39 See Caudle v. District of Columbia, 707 F.3d 354, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2013); McNely v. Ocala 
Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1071 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 
1281, 1289 (2d Cir. 1990); Edwards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6; Shultz v. Rice, 809 F.2d 643, 651–52 
(10th Cir. 1986); Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839. 
 40 See McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 n.3; Johnson, 899 F.2d at 1289; Shultz, 809 F.2d at 651–52; 
Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839. 
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bility-damages distinction, a position that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
joined in its 2013 decision in Caudle.41 Both courts reason that the same 
risk of undue sympathy exists on the issue of liability as well as damages, 
and therefore reject a per se distinction between arguments directed towards 
liability versus damages.42 
Section A of this Part examines the opinions of the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals for the Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits—all of which draw 
a distinction between golden rule arguments directed towards damages and 
liability.43 Section B of this Part discusses the decisions of the Third and 
D.C. Circuits, which reject the damages-liability distinction.44 
A. The Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits Find a Distinction 
Between Golden Rule Arguments on the Issue of Liability and Damages 
The federal appeals courts that allow golden rule arguments in the con-
text of liability find that these arguments do not have the same propensity to 
arouse unfair sympathy as when they are used in the context of damages; 
instead, these courts focus on the liability-context arguments’ purpose of 
helping the jury assess the reasonableness of a party’s actions.45 The Fifth 
Circuit was the first federal appeals court to delineate between golden rule 
arguments directed towards liability and damages.46 In 1976, in Burrage v. 
Harrell, the defendant’s counsel asked the jury to determine the reasonable-
ness of the defendant’s actions by putting themselves in the place of the de-
fendant, who was caught in an emergency situation that resulted in an au-
tomobile accident.47 The court held that this argument related only to the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s actions and that “the argument was not 
immoderate or unduly emotional.”48 Specifically, because the golden rule 
argument related to reasonableness, the court reasoned that it would not un-
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Caudle, 707 F.3d at 357; Edwards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6. 
 42 Caudle, 707 F.3d at 360; Edwards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6. 
 43 See infra notes 45–56 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 57–69 and accompanying text. 
 45 See McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 n.3; Johnson, 899 F.2d at 1289; Shultz, 809 F.2d at 651–52; 
Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839. 
 46 Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839. In Burrage, the plaintiff used previous federal golden rule cases 
to support the contention that the defendant’s golden rule argument—posed in the context of lia-
bility—was prejudicial. Id. The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff could not use the cases 
for support because each of the cases involved golden rule arguments strictly in the context of 
determining damages. Id. 
 47 See id. The issue before the jury was whether the defendant was negligent in the way he 
operated his vehicle in response to the plaintiff’s actions, who either stopped or backed up in front 
of the defendant on an interstate highway after the plaintiff missed his exit. Id. at 838. 
 48 Id. at 839. The Burrage court also considered the fact that the trial judge explained the 
reasonable person standard “quite fully,” which—in the court’s opinion—protected the jury from 
being confused or prejudiced by the golden rule argument. See id. 
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fairly arouse the jury’s sympathies.49 Therefore, there was no risk that the 
argument created a biased verdict and no prejudicial error was established.50 
The Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits later followed the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s lead in drawing a distinction between the contexts of determining lia-
bility and damages.51 For example, in the 1986 Tenth Circuit case, Shultz v. 
Rice, the defendant’s counsel asked the jury to assess reasonableness by 
imagining themselves in the defendant-doctor’s place, who injected a pa-
tient with a treatment that later resulted in injury.52 The court reasoned that 
counsel’s request to the jury was meant to ensure that they assessed the rea-
sonableness of the defendant’s actions with regard to what he knew at the 
time of the alleged negligent act.53 As in the Fifth Circuit, the argument was 
deemed permissible and not prejudicial because it “merely directed the 
minds of the jury toward the ultimate question of [the defendant’s] liability” 
under the reasonable person standard.54 
For a period of time, courts generally accepted the difference between 
golden rule arguments in the contexts of liability and damages and, there-
fore, the issue did not garner much discussion.55 According to the courts 
that observed the differences between these contexts, this had essentially 
developed into a per se distinction.56 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. It should be noted that in Burrage, the Fifth Circuit only held that there was no preju-
dice in the exact circumstances of the case before it. Id. 
 51 See McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 n.3; Johnson, 899 F.2d at 1289; Shultz, 809 F.2d at 651–52. 
 52 809 F.2d at 651. The defendant had administered a hormone to a pregnant woman, claiming 
that he had no reason to suspect that the woman was pregnant. Id. He later ordered a pregnancy 
test for the woman, but did so solely as a formality in conjunction with other blood tests. Id. 
 53 Id. at 652. The crucial time in the case was at the time of the injection, before the doctor 
had received the results of the patient’s pregnancy test. Id. 
 54 Id.; see Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839. 
 55 Cf. McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 n.3; Johnson, 899 F.2d at 1289. For example, in 1990, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Johnson v. Celotex Corp. held that the golden rule 
arguments at issue mainly went to the matter of ultimate liability and were thus not improper. 899 
F.2d at 1289. The Johnson court did not include any discussion of the damages-liability distinc-
tion, leaving the support to a simple citation of Burrage. See id. Similarly, in 1996, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in McNely v. Ocala Star–Banner Corp. held that defense coun-
sel did not use a prohibited golden rule argument by asking jurors to put themselves in the defend-
ant-corporation’s position to determine liability. 99 F.3d at 1071 n.3. At issue was whether the 
plaintiff was terminated because of his disability or for legitimate workplace misconduct. Id. Alt-
hough the McNely court included some reasoning in a footnote, it was simply a recitation of the 
reasoning used in Burrage. See id. 
 56 See McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 n.3; Johnson, 899 F.2d at 1289. Unlike Burrage, the Johnson 
court did analyze the emotional quality of the particular argument used in the case, but stated only 
that the argument went towards liability and was, therefore, not prejudicial. Compare Johnson, 
899 F.2d at 1289 (holding that the golden rule argument was not prejudicial because it was in the 
context of liability), with Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839 (holding that the golden rule argument was not 
prejudicial because it was not immoderate or unduly emotional). 
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B. The Third Circuit and the D.C. Circuit Reject a Distinction Between 
Golden Rule Arguments on the Issues of Liability and Damages 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the District of 
Columbia reason that golden rule arguments related to liability unduly 
arouse a jury’s sympathies, and thus, these courts are unwilling to distin-
guish between the contexts of damages and liability.57 In 1988, the Third 
Circuit in Edwards v. City of Philadelphia broke with its sister circuits and 
rejected the distinction between liability and damages.58 Instead, the court 
held that any use of a golden rule argument is improper.59 The Third Circuit 
explained that arguments towards liability and damages have the same is-
sue: “[T]he creation of undue sympathy and emotion.”60 Thus, the court 
held that there was no reason to distinguish between the two.61 
The D.C. Circuit in Caudle adopted the Third Circuit’s line of reason-
ing, holding that any use of a golden rule argument could arouse undue 
sympathy or emotion in the jury.62 According to the Caudle court, these 
considerations are a risk whenever a golden rule argument is used and thus 
require the granting of a new trial.63 The court reasoned that forbidding 
golden rule arguments will avoid the risk of a jury verdict based on “inap-
propriate considerations such as emotion.”64 The court stated that it is just 
as inappropriate for a jury to be persuaded by emotional argument to deter-
mine liability as it is for damages.65 
Moreover, the Caudle court explained that asking an individual juror to 
think of how they would have felt or acted if they were in the place of a par-
ty is inconsistent with the jury’s duty to apply an objective reasonableness 
person (or employee) standard.66 The reasonableness standard seeks to 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Caudle, 707 F.3d at 360; Edwards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6. Recall that the reasoning be-
hind the universal rejection of golden rule arguments in the context of damages is their capacity to 
unduly incite juror sympathies. See, e.g., Leathers, 546 F.2d at 1086; Callaghan, 98 F.2d at 351; 
Klotz, 267 F.2d at 54–55; F.W. Woolworth, 74 F.2d at 442. 
 58 860 F.2d at 574 n.6. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court only specifically discussed the use of a 
golden rule argument towards damages by the plaintiff, and towards liability by the defendant, but 
one can assume the court meant the rationale to apply to both plaintiffs and defendants on the 
issue of liability, as it was applied to the plaintiffs in Caudle. Cf. Caudle, 707 F.3d at 360; Ed-
wards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6. 
 61 Edwards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6. Interestingly, despite the improper arguments, the court did 
not grant a new trial, reasoning that the judge’s jury instructions prevented any prejudice against 
the plaintiff. See id. at 575. 
 62 See 707 F.3d at 360; Edwards, 860 F.2d at 574 n.6. 
 63 707 F.3d at 360. 
 64 Id.; see also Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The [golden] rule’s 
purpose is to reduce the risk of a jury decision based on emotion rather than trial evidence.”). 
 65 Caudle, 707 F.3d at 360. 
 66 See id. at 361. 
2014] D.C. Circuit Holds That All Golden Rule Arguments Are Prejudicial 83 
avoid the uncertainties that “plague the judicial effort to determine a plain-
tiff’s unusual subjective feelings.”67 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ 
attorney abandoned an objective standard by asking each juror to decide 
how they would feel subjectively in the plaintiffs’ position.68 Therefore, the 
Caudle court held that golden rule arguments are inappropriate in the liabil-
ity context.69 
III. THE CAUDLE DECISION: OVERLOOKING REALITY FOR  
THE APPEARANCE OF OBJECTIVITY 
Golden rule arguments should not be per se impermissible in the context 
of determining liability, but rather it should be left to the trial judge to exer-
cise discretion.70 Specifically, courts should distinguish between golden rule 
arguments in the contexts of liability and damages because these arguments 
serve different purposes depending on the context, and there is thus not the 
same risk of arousing emotion and sympathy when directed towards liabil-
ity.71 
Jurors are usually expected to apply the amorphous reasonable person 
standard without any type of “legal test” to follow.72 Some state instructions 
even remind the jurors that reasonableness is not a predetermined value and is 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68–69 (2006)). 
 68 See id. The court went on to address whether the error warranted a new trial. Id. at 361–63. 
The court looked at the number of inappropriate arguments made by counsel and the actions taken 
by the district court to mitigate the prejudice and concluded that the efforts taken to cure the re-
sulting prejudice were insufficient. Id. at 363. 
 69 Id. at 360. 
 70 See infra notes 77–89 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 77–89 and accompanying text. 
 72 See Stephen Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasona-
ble Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 856 (2001); Richard W. Wright, Negli-
gence in the Courts: Introduction and Commentary, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 432 (2002). For 
example, most jurisdictions provide the following instruction to jurors: “Negligence is lack of 
ordinary care. It is a failure to use that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have 
used under the same circumstances.” See Patrick Kelley & Laurel Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries 
About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 595 (2002) 
(giving examples of several states’ model jury instructions on negligence). Such non-legal tests 
impose no constraints on jurors and inevitably draw upon the jurors’ own subjective life experi-
ences. Cf. Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for 
Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2402–10 (1990) (explaining the theory that jurors 
apply the negligence standard by reference to “community standards”). In contrast, one example 
of a reasonable person standard that aspires to be more objective, i.e., provide a “legal test” for 
jurors to follow, is the Hand formula set forth in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. See 159 F.2d 
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The Hand formula provides jurors with a more guided approach, finding 
liability when the burden of adequate precautions is outweighed by the probability of an accident 
times the severity of the injury. See id. 
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for them to decide.73 Courts that do not allow the use of a golden rule argu-
ment in the liability context assume that the jury is able to objectively apply a 
vacuous reasonably prudent person standard.74 In most jurisdictions, howev-
er, the jury is given little guidance in terms of making such an ostensibly ob-
jective determination.75 Thus, without further instruction, jurors are left to 
consider their own subjective notions and experiences of what constitutes 
social and community standards.76 
 Asking jurors to stand in the shoes of a litigant to determine liability is 
simply a means of providing more guidance to jurors, reminding them to con-
sider the facts at issue only as the party experienced them at the time the inju-
ry occurred.77 Furthermore, articulating a golden rule argument in the liability 
context is also less troublesome because, practically speaking, jurors are 
bound to have already considered themselves in the place of each party.78 In 
truth, every practical application of a reasonable person standard will be by a 
                                                                                                                           
73 See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 72, at 608. One typical provision is Michigan’s definition 
of negligence for juries: “The law does not say what a reasonably careful person using ordinary 
care would or would not do under such circumstances. That is for you to decide.” See id. 
74 See Caudle v. District of Columbia, 707 F.3d 354, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Steven 
Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 
633, 640 (2003) (arguing that individual conceptions of social and community norms are implicit 
in all reasonable person determinations); Timothy D. Lytton, Robert L. Rabin, & Peter H. Schuck, 
Tort as a Litigation Lottery: A Misconceived Metaphor, 52 B.C. L. REV. 267, 275–76 (stating the 
variability of tort verdicts in similar factual situations). 
75 See Gilles, supra note 72, at 856. It is not to argue that there is a specific mathematical test 
that could be applied, the phrase is simply a convenient one to indicate factors that may be consid-
ered. See Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 n.7 
(1927). Proposed legal tests for reasonableness almost always involve some type of cost-benefit 
analysis for the jury to engage in to avoid the jury determining what the standard means. See 
Gilles, supra note 72, at 814–15. 
 76 See Hetcher, supra note 74, at 640. For example, one author illustrates how reasonableness 
will always be based in jurors’ conceptions of social norms by posing the hypothetical question of 
whether it is reasonable to build a hayrick without an aperture. See id. Inevitably, a set of jurors 
living in a region where the norm is to build hayricks with an aperture will reach the opposite 
conclusion from a set of jurors living in a region where the norm is to build hayricks without aper-
tures. Id. Thus, the result of the formal standard is determined through the normative lens of the 
jurors empanelled. See id. See generally Ashley Votruba, Comment, Will the Real Reasonable 
Person Please Stand Up? Using Psychology to Better Understand How Juries Interpret and Apply 
the Reasonable Person Standard, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 703 (2013) (discussing the lack of understand-
ing among courts and scholars of how a jury functionally applies the reasonable person standard 
and suggesting the need for further empirical study). 
 77 See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1071 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996); Shultz v. 
Rice, 809 F.2d 643, 651–52 (10th Cir. 1986); Burrage v. Harrell, 537 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 
1976). 
 78 See Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Millis, 378 F.2d 705, 714 (5th Cir. 1967); Hetcher, supra 
note 74, at 640. 
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particular set of jurors examining their own notions of the actions or feelings 
of an ordinary, reasonable, or prudent person.79 
Although the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits may not expressly rely on these pragmatic observations, 
they nevertheless appear to be the implicit motivation behind drawing the 
damages-liability distinction.80 As recognized by these courts, a golden rule 
argument posed in the context of liability is best interpreted as an attempt to 
direct the jury towards a better understanding of the reasonable person 
standard.81 Allowing golden rule arguments in this context recognizes that 
jurors apply the reasonable person standard through their own perceived 
social norms, based on their common sense and life experiences.82 There-
fore, reminding the jury to make the reasonableness determination by think-
ing of themselves in the same situation and in light of all the evidence pre-
sented is not prejudicial, but is rather a further elucidation of how a reason-
ableness determination is made.83 
As a result, whether a golden rule argument in the context of ultimate 
liability is appropriate should be left to the discretion of the trial judge, ra-
ther than considered per se improper.84 In essence, when counsel asks the 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Hetcher, supra note 74, at 642; Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of 
Community Values in Juries: How “Legal Priming” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (2005); see also Stephen G. Giles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 
VA. L. REV. 1015, 1049 (1994) (discussing the rejection of a model cost-benefit negligence in-
struction by Los Angeles trial court judges on the grounds that it would invade the jury’s prov-
ince). 
 80 See Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839 (holding that the liability-context golden rule argument was 
designed solely to aid jurors in determining “the reasonableness of [the defendant’s] actions”); see 
also McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 n.3 (citing the Burrage court’s reasoning); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 
899 F.2d 1281, 1289 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); Shultz, 809 F.2d at 651–52 (explaining that the liabil-
ity-context golden rule argument was intended “to direct the minds of the jury towards the ulti-
mate question of [the defendant’s] liability”). 
 81 Shultz, 809 F.2d at 652; see McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 n.3; Johnson, 899 F.2d at 1289; Bur-
rage, 537 F.2d at 839. For an example of a state jurisdiction that also approves of the damages-
liability distinction, see Lopez v. Langer, 761 P.2d 1225, 1230–31 (Idaho 1988) (holding a golden 
rule argument permissible in the context of determining the liability of a father for the negligent 
entrustment of an automobile to his 19-year-old son). 
 82 See Shultz, 809 F.2d at 652; Wells, supra note 72, at 2406; see also Shaffer v. Ward, 510 So. 
2d 602, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that counsel’s golden rule argument was “an at-
tempt to ask the jury to use their common, everyday experience in deciding the case,” and there-
fore, not impermissible). 
 83 See Shultz, 809 F.2d at 652; Shaffer, 510 So. 2d at 603; Lopez, 761 P.2d at 1230–31. 
 84 Compare Caudle, 707 F.3d at 360 (finding liability-context golden rule arguments to be per 
se invalid because of their shared concerns with damages-context golden rule arguments), and 
Edwards v. City of Philadelphia, 860 F.2d 568, 574 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988) (same), with supra notes 
71–79 (illustrating how liability-context golden rule arguments are less troublesome than damag-
es-context golden rule arguments and can actually provide a benefit to jurors). See also Stokes v. 
Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983) (“We do not view juries as emotional slot ma-
chines and do not suppose them to be so. Instead we review this type of hyperbolic statement with 
some level of confidence in the maturity of twelve citizens.”); Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839 (illustrat-
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jury to put themselves in the place of a party to determine liability, it is gen-
erally not an attempt to encourage the jury to base their decision on emo-
tion.85 The Caudle court incorrectly assumed that by posing a golden rule 
argument in the context of liability, counsel was asking the jurors if they, 
completely individually and subjectively, would have felt a certain way or 
done a certain act.86 In reality, by posing liability-context golden rule argu-
ments, counsel is asking each juror if, based on common sense and under-
standing of social norms, the juror would find the disputed feelings or ac-
tions reasonable when faced with the circumstances in evidence.87 There-
fore, counsel’s argument is simply a rewording of the reasonable person 
standard to aid the jurors in applying it properly.88 If, however, an attorney’s 
use of the golden rule is an attempt to arouse undue sympathy or emotion, 
then it should be the trial judge’s duty to declare the argument improper.89 
CONCLUSION 
In the 2013 case Caudle v. District of Columbia, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia declined to draw a distinction between 
damages- and liability-context golden rule arguments due to the concern that 
both have the propensity to incite jurors’ emotions. In so doing, the court de-
parted from the reasoning adopted by the Second, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleven 
Circuits that previously addressed the issue. The court instead followed the 
Third Circuit’s reasoning that golden rule arguments not only create a danger 
of disproportionate damage awards, but can also improperly motivate jury 
verdicts on the issue of liability. Importantly though, the dangers perceived by 
the court are already inherent in the reasonable person standard. Furthermore, 
liability-context golden rule arguments provide a benefit to jurors in the form 
of reminding them to only consider the evidence as it existed at the time in 
                                                                                                                           
ing how trial judges can exercise their discretion with regard to liability-context golden rule argu-
ments by holding that such an argument was not prejudicial based on the specific facts of the 
case). 
 85 See Shultz, 809 F.2d at 652 (explaining that the meaning of counsel’s golden rule argument 
was to focus the jury on the defendant’s knowledge at the time of the alleged negligent act); Shaf-
fer, 510 So. 2d at 603 (holding that the golden rule argument’s intent was to remind jurors to use 
“common, everyday experience in deciding the case”). 
 86 See Shaffer, 510 So. 2d at 603 (illustrating how liability-context golden rule arguments are 
not emotional appeals, but instead provide guidance to jurors’ application of the reasonable person 
standard); Hetcher, supra note 74, at 640. See generally Caudle, 707 F.3d at 361 (stating that 
counsel’s golden rule arguments were an attempt to exploit the jurors subjective feelings). 
 87 See Hetcher, supra note 74, at 642; see also Shaffer, 510 So. 2d at 603 (“[The golden rule 
arguments] were an attempt to ask the jury to use their common, everyday experience in deciding 
the case.”). 
 88 See Shultz, 809 F.2d at 652; Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839; Shaffer, 510 So. 2d at 603; Lopez, 
761 P.2d at 1230–31. 
 89 See Stokes, 710 F.2d at 1128; Burrage, 537 F.2d at 839. 
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question. By preventing counsel from making arguments that essentially elu-
cidate the applicable standard, the per se ban on liability-context golden rule 
arguments functions as an unnecessary restraint on counsel’s ability to advo-
cate for their client. 
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